Imagine That! Findings in Hypothetical Trauma Exposure and Treatment Choices Amongst Law Enforcement Officers.

Imagine That! Findings in Hypothetical Trauma Exposure and Treatment Choices Amongst Law Enforcement Officers.

A review of:
Becker, C. B., Meyer, G., Price, J. S., Graham, M. M., Arsena, A., Armstrong, D.A., Ramon, E. (2009). Law enforcement preferences for PTSD treatment and crisis management alternatives. Behavior Research and Therapy, 47(3), 245-253.

by Sarah E. Barwick.

Evidence based treatments (EBT), particularly exposure techniques, may be underutilized in the treatment of PTSD due to several patient and therapist factors. For example, a therapist may feel nervous about their lack of training in EBT or may feel distressed over patient discomfort. Research to date has focused primarily on therapist factors that limit the use of EBT, whereas research on patient factors that limit EBT remains limited. Furthermore, previous studies have examined primarily collegiate samples, limiting the generalizibility of the findings.

In an attempt to expand on previous research, the current study focused on active and aspiring law enforcement officers, a population of particular interest when examining PTSD. Law enforcement officers are commonly exposed to trauma, and often experience significant symptomology related to this exposure. Participants (N= 379) included 156 active law enforcement officers, 108 police academy cadets, and 99 criminal justice students. Researchers aimed to expand on investigations conducted by Becker et al (2007), which examined PTSD treatment preferences in similar samples.

After giving informed consent, participants read a hypothetical traumatic scenario in which they were asked to imagine shooting a 15 year-old suspect in self-defense. The scenario then described an emergence of hypothetical PTSD symptoms following their alleged exposure that interfered with their professional and personal functioning. Following this, participants read through randomly ordered descriptions of treatment options, including Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy (EMDR), Exposure therapy, medication treatment (Zoloft), Brief Eclectic Psychotherapy (BEP), and Psychodynamic therapy. Each participant then rated their projected credibility of each treatment, choosing their top and bottom two choices using a modified version of the Credibility Scale (CS; Addis & Carpenter, 1999). An additional evaluation of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) followed treatment descriptions and ratings. Researchers hypothesized that CPT and exposure therapy would be chosen as most preferred of all treatments.

Results indicated that criminal justice students reported a higher incidence of traumatic exposure (61.0%) than did cadets (36.0%) or active duty officers (48%). Because rates of PTSD were the same among all groups, the data was collapsed for analysis. Regarding the most preferable treatment options, results indicated that the two most preferred treatments were CPT (36.9%) and exposure (25.9%) followed by psychodynamic therapy (13.2%), Zoloft (9.2%), BEP (9%), and EMDR (1.8%). CPT and exposure accounted for 87% of either first or second choice of treatment.

It should be noted that participants who met criteria for PTSD (n = 36) demonstrated a different trend when ranking proposed treatments. Although CPT was the most preferred treatment (38.9%), psychodynamic therapy was ranked second (25.0%) followed by BEP (13.9%), exposure therapy (11.1%), Zoloft (8.3%), and EMDR. Based on these results, it could be argued that the PTSD group yielded a more accurate list of treatment preference, as other participants were choosing under added projective conditions. Though much smaller in sample size, participants in the PTSD are far more representative of the study’s group of interest. These findings contradict the study’s hypothesis that CPT and exposure are the most preferred treatments among officers with PTSD.

This study has several limitations. The occurrence of PTSD may have been highly underreported among active law enforcement officers and cadets. Both groups reported lower incidences of Criterion A trauma than did criminal justice students. This finding may be the result of the “tough it out” mentality common among law enforcement officers. Reported PTSD symptomology may have also been underreported and, if so, the data should not have been collapsed. Furthermore, this study reports only projective data and therefore results are not indicative of actual treatment preference. To determine preference among actual treatment populations, future research should include during-treatment and post-treatment measurements.

To cite this review, please use this reference: Barwick, S. B. (2009). Imagine That! Findings in Hypothetical Trauma Exposure and Treatment Choices Amongst Law Enforcement Officers. Psychology Alert (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/07/imagine-that-findings-in-hypothetical.html

Are Boys Better at Math Than Girls? The True Reason for Math and Science Gender Inequality.

Are boys better at math than girls? The true reason for math and science gender inequality.
A review of:
Huguet, P. & Regner, I. (2009, in-press). Counter-stereotypic beliefs in math do not protect school girls from stereotype threat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
by Lori-Lyn Gulley Boynton.

Stereotype Threat (ST) occurs when individuals perform at a lower level than their potential ability due to a perceived threat of confirming or disconfirming a negative stereotype about their group’s performance. ST has been found to effect female’s math performance, and spatial reasoning in the general population, thus contributing to a lack of female advancement in scientific careers (Ben-Zeev, Duncan, & Forbes, 2005; Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005; McGlone & Aronson, 2006).
Studies using samples of elementary and middle school students in the general population have also found that ST may influence girl’s performance by preventing them from performing at their optimal level (Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001; Hyde and Lynn, 2006). When this occurs, studies fail to show a gender gap on math tests which may be severely misleading. Therefore, in elementary and middle school populations, ST may still be operating even if it is not reflected in a gender gap. When ST goes unrecognized, it can have detrimental effects on female students without anyone realizing it. Yet, the knowledge of negative stereotypes does not ensure that ST will be prevented.
Huguet & Regner (2009), designed a study with the assumption that girls who have counter-stereotypic beliefs may not be protected from ST. They included 199 middle-school students (92 girls and 107 boys) ranging from 11 to 13-years-old, from eight public schools in France. The students were all given a task that has been found to detect ST by integrating visual-perceptual and spatial skills, along with cognitive and meta-cognitive processes necessary for academic performance (Kirkwood, Weiler, Bernstein, Forbes, & Waber, 2001). All of the students were given the identical test, but some were informed that the test would measure their geometry ability, while others were told the test measured their drawing ability. After the test the students were given a questionnaire to assess their stereotypic-related beliefs including ratings of their own age group, self-evaluated ability, and their perceived importance.
Results indicated that girls who were told they were taking a geometry test performed significantly worse than when they were informed it was a drawing test; whereas the boys performed the same in both conditions. They also found that girls scored higher than boys when the test was labeled as drawing, but they scored significantly worse than boys when the test was labeled geometry. When measuring the girl’s beliefs about gender and geometry ability, girl’s beliefs were counter-stereotypic on average. For self-evaluations the girls underestimated their ability in geometry, even though they had similar geometry grades compared to boys in their class, and held counter-stereotypic beliefs. These results are consistent with the researcher’s hypothesis that counter-stereotypic beliefs do not protect against ST. The finding that the girls scored significantly better when the test was labeled as drawing indicates that the girls were not performing at their potential when the test was labeled geometry.
Huguet & Regner (2009) conclude that their study serves as evidence that ST may not be visible; therefore it is important for teachers, parents, and policy makers to focus on ST interventions regardless of gender gaps to increase gender equality in math and science.

To cite this review, please use this reference: Boynton, L. G. (2009). Are boys better at math than girls? The true reason for math and science gender inequality. Psychology Alert (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/05/are-boys-better-at-math-than-girls-true.html

Physiological Arousal and Anxiety Sensitivity in Socially Anxious Youth: Implications for Treatment

Sensitivity in Socially Anxious Youth: Implications for Treatment

A review of:

Anderson, E.R. & Hope, D.A. (2009). The relationship among social phobia, objective and perceived physiological reactivity, and anxiety sensitivity in an adolescent population. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 18-26

by Denise Fournier.

Research on social phobia has introduced a number of theories to explain the development and maintenance of this anxiety disorder. The existing research regarding the physiological differences between anxious and non-anxious youth has introduced possible explanations for the development and maintenance of anxiety experienced by socially phobic individuals. However, the research leaves many questions unanswered. The preponderance of research that has been conducted to study the evidence of physiological arousal in socially phobic individuals under anxiety-provoking situations has been conducted with adult samples, with only three studies having been conducted with a sample of children and adolescents. To attempt to provide clarity to the issue of physiological arousal and its manifestation in socially phobic youth, Anderson and Hope developed a study with the primary goal of investigating objective versus perceived physiological arousal and the differences in anxiety sensitivity between non-anxious and socially phobic adolescents.

The current study included a sample of 392 adolescents (213 girls and 179 boys) between the ages of thirteen and seventeen. Eighty five participants with social phobia were included in the study to investigate the differences in objective and perceived physiological arousal between the anxious and non-anxious adolescents. Anderson and Hope (2009) hypothesized that the adolescents with social phobia would exhibit greater increases in blood pressure and heart rate, and show higher levels of perceived physiological arousal and anxiety sensitivity than the non-anxious participants. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) was used to measure perceived anxiety and perceived physiological arousal during two anxiety-provoking tasks. Heart rate and blood pressure measurements were also assessed during each task.

The results of the study indicated no significant difference between the anxious and non-anxious participants on physiological arousal, as measured by heart rate and blood pressure. These results did not support the authors’ hypothesis that the anxious adolescents would experience greater increases in blood pressure and heart rate than the non-anxious adolescents in the study. The second hypothesis, that the anxious participants would evidence higher levels of perceived physiological arousal and anxiety sensitivity, was supported by the results of the study. Anderson and Hope (2009) surmise that it is possible that adolescents exhibiting social phobia show more self-focused attention, which makes them increasingly aware of the minimal physiological changes that take place during anxiety-provoking tasks.

The results of the present study indicate the need for further research on the manifestation of social phobia in adolescents. The inclusion of measures to assess self-reported anxiety serves as the primary strength of the current study, as it indicates the need for those who work with socially anxious youth to normalize the experience of physiological arousal during anxiety-inducing tasks. The ability to accurately measure changes in heart rate and blood pressure was limited as a result of a malfunctioning of the heart rate and blood pressure monitors that were used during the study. This malfunctioning may have affected the results, and future studies should attempt to more clearly identify the changes in blood pressure and heart rate between socially anxious and non-anxious participants.

Future studies on social phobia in adolescents should emphasize the significance of the difference in self-reported anxiety between anxious and non-anxious youth. Furthermore, the results of the present study invite future research to clarify the impact that a diagnosis of social phobia has on a socially anxious youth. The present study addresses the need to normalize the experience of physiological arousal during anxiety-provoking tasks. Implementing this finding in future attempts at treating social phobia can potentially lessen the fear of socially anxious adolescents that they will experience social embarrassment as a result of their anxiety.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Fournier, D. (2009).Physiological Arousal and Anxiety Sensitivity in Socially Anxious Youth: Implications for Treatment. Psychology Alert (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/02/physiological-arousal-and-anxiety.html

Behavior Activation (classic)

A Review of:
Jacobson, N.S., Dobson, K.S., Truax, P.A., Addis, M.E., Koerner, K., Gollan, J.K., et al. (1996). A component analysis of cognitive behavioral treatment for depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 295–304.
by Lorena Marker

Beck stated that depressed individuals have stable cognitive schemas due to early experiences, and that using a full treatment of CT would be better than using either AT (Automatic Thoughts), or BA (Behavior Activation) treatments alone. In this experiment by Jacobson and colleagues, they set out to test this hypothesis. It is noted that most of the changes occurred within the first few weeks of therapy for all three treatments, and this experiment disproved the idea that CT is better than BA or AT alone.

This research states that Behavior Activation alone or AT alone are equally as beneficial as CT. The BA group used the following techniques as shown in the article; “monitoring of daily activities, assessing the pleasure and mastery that was achieved by engaging in a variety of activities, the assignment of increasingly more difficult tasks that have the prospect of engendering a sense of pleasure or mastery, cognitive rehearsal, discussion of specific problems, and developing better communication skills.” (p.297)

In activation and the modification of dysfunctional thoughts, the therapist listened for cognitive distortions, and the following methods were used ; noticing mood shifts in therapy sessions and asking for the thoughts that preceded the mood shift, using a daily record of dysfunctional thoughts as a form of personal diary to note problematic events, reexamining thoughts, coping, and assessing their interpretations.

And finally in the full CT treatment all the above were used including the use of the “downward arrow” which is a technique where the therapists asks the client explanations about why certain problems have emerged, in order to indentify core beliefs; also explicit identification of underlying assumptions by direct report or inference of therapist, identification of alternative assumptions, and discussing pros and cons of core beliefs.

To reference this review, please use this reference:
Marker, L. (2009). Behavior Activation (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/03/behavior-activation-classic.html

Specificity of Intolerance of Uncertainty on Social Anxiety

Specificity of Intolerance of Uncertainty on Social Anxiety
A review of:
Boelen, P. A. & Reijntjes, A. (2009). Intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety. Journal of Anxiety Disorders. 23, 130-135
By Kristen Perkins


In this article Boelen and Reijntjes (2009)seek to examine the link between intolerance of uncertainty (IU) with the severity of social anxiety symptoms. Previous research has indicated IU as highly significant in individuals suffering with GAD and OCD while less predictive of depression and other anxiety disorders including panic disorder. Since IU is operationally defined as finding uncertainty stressful, fearing that uncertainty reflects poorly on the individual, and blocks constructive action, it appeared reasonable that this type of intolerance of ambiguity may be reflected in social anxiety through the fear, avoidance and physical discomfort frequently observed in those suffering from this disorder.


The authors described two main goals of this study. The first was to examine the potential of IU to account for the variance within symptom severity of social anxiety while controlling for multiple previously established cognitive correlates. These correlates included fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, low self-esteem, perfectionism, and pathological worry. The authors also indicated that they controlled for neuroticism so as to evaluate the other cognitive correlates independent of this feature. The second goal was to seek to further increase the understanding of the specificity of IU to social anxiety, OCD, GAD, and depression with an expectation that IU would indeed be related to symptoms for each of the anxiety disorders while not directly related to depression symptoms.


Participants (126 total, average age 47, 91% female) were provided with a consent form, informational letter and 11 self-report questionnaires measuring the constructs of intolerance of uncertainty, fear of negative evaluation, perfectionism, pathological worry, self-esteem, anxiety sensitivity, social phobia, depression, GAD, OCD, and neuroticism.


To address the first goal discussed by the authors of this article, results of the statistical analysis suggest that as expected, fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, pathological worry and low self-esteem were significantly correlated with social anxiety. When neuroticism was controlled for, the results suggest that IU may well play an important role in social anxiety accounting for a significant portion of the variance above and beyond those of the most strongly correlated factors of fear of negative evaluation and anxiety sensitivity. To address the second goal, outcomes suggest that the author’s expectations about specificity were correct. Intolerance of uncertainty was identified to have greater specificity to OCD severity, followed by social anxiety, GAD, and depression respectively. These results offer support of earlier research finding IU to be correlated with OCD and GAD but not depression. An important contribution of this is study is the link observed between IU and social anxiety.


Several significant limitations must be acknowledged. Participants were originally recruited for participation in a grief study advertised in the newspaper. Respondents were provided an informational packet regarding the current study as well as the outcome of the grief study they originally responded to. Although participants in the current study had experienced the loss a minimum of 18 months earlier, and depression levels were non-clinical, it’s possible the selection process resulted in a population that may have been sensitized to uncertainty resulting from their recent loss and thus not reflective of the general population or anxiety and depression populations. Participation in the study was somewhat labor intensive given the number of questionnaires administered and the possibility of respondent fatigue must also be considered. Additionally, no conclusions about causality may be made given the cross-sectional design of the study. Despite these limitations, the study does suggest that further investigation of IU into severity of social anxiety as well the possible specificity to other psychological disorders is warranted.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Perkins, K. (2009). Specificity of Intolerance to Uncertainty on Social Anxiety (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/02/specificity-of-intolerance-of.html

Self Medication as a Marker of Risk of DSM Diagnosis along Axes I and II

Self Medication as a Marker of Risk of DSM Diagnosis along Axes I and II
A Review of:
Robinson, J., Sareen, J., Cox, B. J., & Bolton, J. (2009). Self-medication of anxiety disorders with alcohol and drugs: Results from a nationally representative sample. Journal of Anxiety Disorders 23 (2009) 38–45.
by Major, C. T.

Earlier studies that correlated anxiety and substance abuse typically treated these conditions as overarching categories, and often hypothesized that self medication for anxiety may cause the substance abuse disorder. In contrast, Robinson et al. (2009) have available the results of the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), a longitudinal study that surveys self-medication as a behavior separate from comorbid DSM disorders including substance abuse. As a result, the authors observe that self medication may be a significant marker of risk of diagnosis of various DSM disorders. The potential clinical value of such a finding is that the data might support adding questions about self medication to instruments that detect the presence of, or rate the severity of, certain DSM disorders.

The authors’ calculations of adjusted-odds ratios (AOR) for risk of disorder are striking. For example, merely by learning that a person self medicates for anxiety using both alcohol and some other drug, the odds are nearly 1 in 20 that such a person is diagnosable as also suffering from paranoid personality disorder (AOR = 4.88 (3.27–7.27) where p < .001). Such a ratio is approximately double the prevalence of that condition in the general population, thus potentially making report of self medication useful as an adjunct measure of probability of comorbidity. In the largest sense the study reveals the utility of gathering data along as many dimensions as possible (per NESARC), and that multivariate analysis of such a data set can reveal new correlations that may have practical clinical value in predicting and measuring comorbidity of disorder and severity of condition. Self medication as a variable appears to be such a marker.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Major, C. T. (2009). Self Medication as a Marker of Risk of DSM Diagnosis along Axes I and II (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/02/self-medication-as-marker-of-risk-of.html

Minimum Payment Information May Actually Harm Credit Card Customers

Minimum Payment Information May Actually Harm Credit Card Customers
A Review of:
Stewart, J. (2009). The Cost of anchoring on credit-card minimum payments. Psychological Science in the Public Interest (in press).
by Martine Luntz

In this study, Stewart (in press, 2009) tackles the widespread problem of credit card debt. Previous research indicates that the minimum payment information provided by credit card companies, and required by law in both the United States and the United Kingdom, actually has a deleterious effect on the tendency of borrowers to keep up with payments. Stewart contends that although minimum payments are designed to protect consumers from the effect of compounding interest, they actually act as “psychological anchors”. In other words, when people are assigned a minimum amount, they generally pay less than they would have if no amount had been listed. A lower payment results in greater interest payments as the debt accrues. If this is the case, the laws that are supposed to protect consumers are unintentionally providing a greater barrier to avoiding credit card debt.

Stewart distributed a survey to confirm his hypothesis that credit card payments are correlated with minimum payments. Two hundred and forty-eight United Kingdom credit card holders responded with information on their credit card payments and the minimums required. The data confirmed that there was a significant positive correlation between minimum payment and actual repayment. In other words, the higher the minimum payment, the greater the amount paid. The results accounted for only partial repayments; minimum only repayments and full repayments were not affected by the minimum payment information.

To further investigate the relationship between minimum payment information and actually repayment, Stewart designed a hypothetical bill-payment experiment. The independent variable was the presence of minimum payment information and the dependent variable was the amount the participant would hypothetically choose to pay. The participants were a mixture of campus visitors, web page visitors, and participants recruited by a market research company.
The results show that whilst full repayments were not significantly affected by the inclusion of minimum payment information, partial repayments were. As hypothesized, minimum payment information reduced repayments of all sizes. The effect was dramatic as repayments rose from 23% of the balance when minimum payment information was present, to 40% when that information was removed.

The data from both Stewart’s survey and his experiment provide evidence that minimum-payment information does reduce the size of partial payments, supporting his hypothesis that minimum payment information acts as a psychological anchor for borrowers.
To reduce the anchoring by credit card borrowers, Stewart suggests that credit card companies be mandated to provide information such as alternative repayment scenarios to consumers. This suggestion is based on previous research that a decrease in uncertainty decreases the tendency to rely on arbitrary anchors.

The strengths of Stewart’s study are numerous. First, Stewart acquired support for his hypothesis from both a survey and an experiment, which strengthens his conclusions. Second, the results of both studies were statistically significant and dramatic. An increase in repayment from 23% to 40% with the removal of minimum-payment information is impressive. Third, the counterintuitive idea that minimum-payment information acts a barrier to repayment is a creative hypothesis. This research could lead to innovative psychological approaches in the attempt to reduce the epidemic of credit card debt.

The limitation of Stewart’s article can be expressed as a global lack of descriptive information. The literature review is shallow. It would have been helpful to have a richer background on the definition of anchoring, including examples of psychological anchors other than minimum-payments. There are also holes in the description of the method of both the survey and the experiment. Stewart does not mention how the surveys were distributed or what the response rate was, nor does he provide the demographic information of the respondents. In his description of the participants in the experiment, he declines to mention the name of the campus and the web site at which the participants were visitors or how he motivated them to participate. He also neglects to mention demographic information of these participants. Without this demographic information, it would be difficult to generalize the results of the study.

In conclusion, although some additional information in Stewart’s article may have been helpful, his is a relevant study that provides insight into contributing factors to the tendency of people to fall into credit card debt. The results of his study could help regulation agencies create laws that are more effective in protecting customers from increasing debt and the consequential compounding interest.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Luntz, M. (2009). Minimum Payment Information May Actually Harm Credit Card Customers (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/02/minimum-payment-information-may.html

Inhibiting the Automatic Panic Response by Changing Cognitions

Inhibiting the Automatic Panic Response by Changing Cognitions

A Review of:
Teachman, B.A., Marker, C.D., & Smith-Janik, S.B. (2008). Automatic associations and panic disorder: Trajectories of change over the course of treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 76(6), 988-1002.
by Lauren C. Alexander

No matter what the fear, humans are almost always able to attend to cues related to that specific fear despite being amidst a multitude of stimuli competing for attention. Likewise, the maladaptive schemata of panic describes how individuals are hyper vigilant to danger cues, remember those cues related to their fears, and will assign threatening interpretations to ambiguous cues. Moreover, there is mounting evidence of the likelihood that automatic panic associations are operating in individuals with panic disorder, however, these associations seem to be absent in nonanxious individuals.

Unfortunately, the massive body of anxiety research is lacking in studies that can demonstrate that changes in automatic panic associations are the variables driving treatment response. A few researchers have studied whether the effectiveness of CBT could be at least partially explained by changes in cognition, but no research thus far has examined the temporal relationship between changes in cognition and CBT effectiveness. Accordingly, this research examined whether changes in automatic panic associations were temporally related to changes in panic symptoms.

In order to explore this hypothesized relationship, Teachman, Marker, and Smith-Janik recruited 43 participants who met criteria for panic disorder and reported having a panic attack in the past month. Comorbidities were present in many of the participants, but only those that were likely to influence treatment response (e.g. current psychosis) were exclusion criteria. All participants completed the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II), Fear Questionnaire-Agoraphobia Subscale (F-Q Agoraphobia), and the Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS). Also, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) was used to measure automatic panic associations. In addition, the IAT appears to be able to measure some of the qualities associated with automatic panic schemata through measuring an individual’s interwoven cognitive panic associations. The treatment protocol was completed in 12 weeks with a highly-structured 90- minute session occurring each week. Also, the IAT and the four other questionnaire measures were completed prior to Session 1 and then following Sessions 3, 6, 9, and 12.

Results indicated significant effects of treatment over time for the PDSS, ASI, BDI-II, and F-Q Agoraphobia and suggest that treatment was generally effective. However, individual variability was considerable and additional statistical techniques were used that would more accurately address their hypothesis. The authors used an advanced statistical technique that is able to model one variable as a leading indicator of change in another variable. Accordingly, this technique showed that automatic panic associations do change over time in CBT and that these changes are correlated with symptom reduction.

These findings allow for inferences to be made that changes in maladaptive schemata precede and contribute to symptom change. Likewise, this research provides the anxiety field with one of the first pieces of evidence demonstrating that automatic interpreting and responding to feared stimuli can actually change with CBT. Thus, being able to change this cognitive processing could aid in the recovery of individuals disabled by panic disorder.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Alexander, L. C. (2009). Inhibiting the Automatic Panic Response by Changing Cognitions (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/01/inhibiting-automatic-panic-response-by.html

Confessions as Guaranteed Truths

A Review of:
Hasel, L. E. & Kassin, S. M. (2009; In-press). On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence:
Can Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications? Psychological Science.
by Micol Levi-Minzi

In this article Hasel and Kassin (2008) examine the impact of criminal confessions on eyewitness identification. The authors begin by discussing the Innocence Project, which has pardoned hundreds of innocent individuals who have been unjustly imprisoned for crimes they never committed. In the last decade organizations such as the Innocence Project have brought these types of situations to the public eye, and in this paper Hasel and Kassin (2008) take the issue one step further. The authors imply that although the public often views confessions as guaranteed truths they are frequently the result of coercion or responses to false evidence. Once individuals confess, either falsely or truthfully, the confession itself can taint other evidence. Hasel and Kassin (2008) focus on how confessions can contaminate eyewitness testimony.

In this study, Hasel and Kassin (2008) utilized 260 undergraduate students in a two phase experiment. Initially the students were told they would be participating in a persuasion technique study; however, once brought to the lab they witnessed an individual steal a laptop from the experimenter's desk. Upon returning to the lab, the experimenter explained to the participants that he or she knew a study on criminal investigations was taking place. The experimenter reported that he or she would proceed by gathering eyewitness accounts, questioning a set of suspects and ultimately deciding whom to charge for the crime. The experimenter enlisted the assistance of all the participants in solving the crime. The participants were asked to view a six person photographic line-up in which the actual thief was missing and determine which, if any, of the individuals represented in the line-up committed the crime. Lastly, participants were asked to rate the confidence they had in their line-up decision.

In the second phase of the study participants were asked to return to the lab two days after the theft. Depending on whether the participants had chosen a suspect from the six person photographic line-up or not, the experimenter proceeded in different ways. If the participant had chosen an individual from the line-up the experimenter, by random assignment, indicated one of the following: that the chosen individual had indeed confessed, all of the suspects had denied participating in the crime, the chosen individual had denied involvement, or another suspect had confessed to the crime. If the experimenter presented a confession he or she also produced a handwritten and signed admission of the crime. If the participants had not chosen a subject from the six person photographic line-up, the experimenter proceeded, again by random assignment, to indicate one of the following: that all the suspects had denied participating in the crime, an unspecified suspect from the line-up had confessed, or a specified suspect from the line-up had confessed. After each of these various scenarios the experimenter continued by asking all the participants to again rate their confidence level in their original decision. The experimenter then gave participants the option to reconsider their first choice, regardless of if they had originally chosen a suspect from the line-up or not. Finally, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their second choice.

After considering attrition and exclusion of subjects because of subject suspiciousness, familiarity with the thief or other reasons that would compromise the study, results of 206 participants were used. A significant number of participants who were told their choice from the original line-up had confessed reported an increase in confidence in their choice. Interestingly, a majority of participants who were told that a different suspect confessed changed their mind and reported the confessor as the criminal. Although the authors mention possible flaws with their research due to the use of college students as participants, a mock crime and the lack of high-stake consequences rendering the identification decisions moot, the study is informative and future research in this area must be borne out of this body of work. This study should be replicated using different populations and simulating more various types of crimes. The issue of false confessions and tainted eyewitness accounts is of incredible importance not only for the integrity of our legal system, but for the thousands of individuals who are accused of crimes on a daily basis.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Levi-Minzi, M. (2009). Confessions as Guaranteed Truths. Psychology Alert (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/01/confessions-as-guaranteed-truths.html

Anxiety and Self-medication: Implications for Clinical Practice

Self-evaluation versus public evaluation
A Review of:
Robinson, J., Sareen, J., Cox, B.J., and Bolton, J.(2009). Self-medication of anxiety disorders with alcohol and drugs: Results from a nationally representative sample. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 38-45.
by Heather N. Goddard

Research across a variety of clinical and community based samples has concluded that anxiety disorders and substance use disorders are common comorbidities. Despite establishing that this frequent co-occurrence exists, few studies have offered a plausible explanation for the relationship. Robinson, Sareen, Cox, and Bolton (2009) attempted to explore one probable explanation know as the “self-medication hypothesis.” This hypothesis suggested that people with a primary diagnosis of an anxiety disorder attempt to self-medicate their anxiety symptoms which then develop into a substance use disorder. Previous research has attempted to explore this phenomenon on clinical samples which affect generalizability. Additionally, previous studies have failed to differentiate between methods of self medication, alcohol and/or drugs.

The current study includes individuals from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) who met DSM-IV criteria for anxiety disorder (N = 7177). Participants were assessed for mood, anxiety, personality disorder, and substance use disorders. Method of self-medication was only assessed across four anxiety diagnoses (panic disorder, social phobia, specific phobia, and generalized anxiety disorder). Information was then gathered regarding type of self-medication employed; alcohol, alcohol and drugs, or no self-medication. Self-medication with drugs only encompassed an especially small group and was thus omitted. Lastly, sociodemographic data was compiled in regards to income, race, education, marital status, age, gender, and urbanicity.

Results indicated that rates of self-medication using alcohol were highest for those diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder (18.5%), social phobia (16.9%), and panic disorder with agoraphobia (15.0%). No significant differences were found with regards to gender or other socio demographic variables.

Highest rates for self-medication with alcohol and drugs were panic disorder with agoraphobia (14.9%) and generalized anxiety disorder (7.4%). This type of self-medication was more common with men (55.8%) versus women (44.2%), younger age groups (18-44), separated or never married, lower income, and less educated.

Research supports the importance of a comprehensive assessment of drug and alcohol use when working with individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders. With the addiction potential of many prescribed anxiety medications, clinicians need to inform individuals with the risk involved. Although properly prescribed medications may appear effective in the short-term, there seems to be an increased risk for substance use disorders with long-term or excessive use.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Goddard, H. N. (2009). Anxiety and Self-medication: Implications for Clinical Practice (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/01/anxiety-and-self-medication.html

Fight or Flight, Testosterone, and Dominance

Self-evaluation versus public evaluation
A review of:
Maner, J.K., Miller, S.L., Schmidt N.B., & Eckel, L.A. (2008). Submitting to defeat Social Anxiety: Dominance threat, and decrements in testosterone. Psychological Science. 19, 764-768.
by Michael Morreale

Miller, et al. (2008) have conducted a study to test two hypotheses. One is that a threat to social dominance would be associated with decreased levels of testosterone among individuals who scored high when tested for social anxiety. The other was that this response would be specific to males. The depletion in testosterone levels in humans and other animals is a characteristic of submissive behavior. In essence, they wanted to see if social anxiety serves to shape a response when a male’s dominance is threatened. Their hypotheses seem to be correct.

In the experiment, participants were matched with confederates to compete with them in rigged games causing them to lose by a wide margin. Salivary samples were taken before and after the games, to assess the levels of testosterone present in the body. They had a sample of 58 undergraduate students, 35 women and 23 men with an average age of 18.9. Participants were told the study was an investigation in leadership styles, personality, and hormones. The participant’s level of social anxiety was assessed by completing a social phobia scale.

Decrements in testosterone were found following a defeat in socially anxious men, but not in women. Men who did not score high in social anxiety actually had an increase in testosterone as a response to having their dominance threatened. This trend fits when examined under an evolutionary lens. In terms of reproduction, men have more to gain by achieving a higher place in the hierarchy of dominance than women do. This suggests that social anxiety may have a stronger link with concerns about social dominance in men than in women.

As mentioned by Miller, et al. (2008), submissive strategies can be seen as both adaptive and maladaptive depending on their severity and frequency. It can lead to avoiding potential harm, or additional loss. However, if exaggerated it could place a strain on interpersonal relationships as well as threaten ones status within a group. This is the first study to provide direct evidence that social anxiety shapes responses to social dominance threats. This reflects the trend of socially anxious men to an orientation towards social submission.

As stated by Miller, et al. (2008),the experiment revealed no relationship between social anxiety and base level testosterone. This suggests that social anxiety is linked to the manner in which a person responds to dominance threats as opposed to their base line level of dominance.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Morreale, M. (2009). Fight or Flight, Testosterone, and Dominance. Psychology Alert (3). http://psychologyalert.com/2009/01/fight-or-flight-testosterone-and.html

Self-evaluation versus public evaluation

Self-evaluation versus public evaluation
A review of:
Chambers, J. R., Epley, N., Savitsky, K., & Windschitl, P. D. (2008). Knowing too much: Using private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others. Psychological Science, 19(6), 542-548.
by Abby B. Stevens

People often find it difficult to predict how others perceive them. Chambers, Epley, Savitsky, and Windschitl (2008) hypothesize that the knowledge that individuals have about themselves (e.g., specific faults they possess, how they behave in a given situation, etc) is often detrimental to their ability to predict how others perceive them.

Chambers, et al. (2008) performed multiple experiments to test this hypothesis. One experiment examined the extent of impact an individual’s private practice trial had on their self-evaluation of their public performance on a given task. This would additionally impact how that individual believed their performance was to be viewed by others. Results found that the individuals perceived their public performances to be better when they improved from the practice trial and that they perceived their performances more negatively when they did more poorly in the public performance. Individuals who performed better than expected anticipated higher ratings from observers in the public trial than those who performed worse than expected. Another experiment involved individuals who were under the impression that their performance on a task was significantly below average compared to peers. They were to predict how an evaluator would rate their performance. Individuals were judged either by their own individual observer or by an observer who also judged other members in their group. Surprisingly, individuals who were observed privately did not take into account that observers were unaware of other group members’ scores. Therefore, individuals who were observed both privately and publicly predicted observers would evaluate them negatively. In a final experiment, participants were asked to realistically imagine themselves performing some task, and it was hypothesized that this would produce an assimilation effect (individuals who imagined a positive performance would expect others to view the performance as positive, and those who imagined a negative performance expected others to view their performance in a negative light). This assimilation effect differs from the contrast effect observed in the experiments mentioned above. Results indicate that individuals who were expected to imagine themselves in a favorable fashion did, in fact, expect higher evaluations from others than did those who imagined themselves unfavorably. However, this was not reflected in observers’ evaluations; those expected to be evaluated positively overestimated the positive evaluation and those who expected to be evaluated negatively underestimated the evaluations they received.

Thus, this study has shown that past performances, performances of others, and imaginary performances affect how individuals evaluate themselves and in turn affect how they expect others to evaluate them. These findings may shed some light as to why people have difficulty accurately estimating how others will evaluate them.

Chambers, et al. (2008) suggest that people use this private-context information because it is encoded initially and is included in the self-evaluation from that point forward. Additionally, it is extremely difficult to disregard that initially encoded, negative information. Therefore, despite attempts to rid ones mind of that damaging information, individuals tend to continue to form opinions of themselves based on this.

It must be noted, as mentioned by Chambers, et al. (2008), that different individuals will evaluate situations in varying ways. Thus, a close friend or family member will often evaluate an individual more positively than an enemy would evaluate that individual in the same situation. Therefore, this must be kept in mind when considering the results of this study.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Stevens, A. B. (2008). Self-evaluation versus public evaluation. Psychology Alert (2). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/12/self-evaluation-versus-public.html

Stereotype Threat (Classic)

Article Critique of:
Steele, Claude M. & Aronson, Joshua (1995). Stereotype treat and the intelligence test
performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5,
797-811.
By Alla Andelman

This study comprised of four experiments to discover if stereotype threat had a negative impact on the performance of African Americans on a verbal intelligence test. The authors theorized that a stereotype threat would arise from the anticipation of having to take a difficult test, and would furthermore hinder performance on that test. Test 1 measured 114 Black and White (male and female) participants, randomly assigning them to the diagnostic condition (where participants thought ability was being tested), the non-diagnostic condition (where testing for ability was denied), and the non-diagnostic condition-plus-challenge (where participants were asked to take their challenge seriously. Results showed that Blacks in the diagnostic condition did slightly worse, and Whites in the non-diagnostic condition-plus challenge did slightly better then all the others, which were very similar, though none of these differences were statistically significant. The authors concluded that while they felt their results supported their hypothesis, it needed to be tested for reliability. Test 2 was meant to do that. It tested 20 Black and White female participants in only the diagnostic and non-diagnostic conditions. Results showed Black participants in the diagnostic condition performed worse than all other groups. The authors concluded that this established the reliability of their hypothesis posed in Test 1. In Test 3, 35 Black (9 male), and 33 White (20 male) were assigned to either a diagnostic, non-diagnostic, or control condition (where there was no mention of participants being tested) were given measures to test for stereotype activation, self-doubt activation, stereotype avoidance, indication of race, and self-handicapping were tested. Results showed significantly higher scores of stereotype activation for all conditions for Blacks, and higher self-doubt activation for Blacks in the diagnostic condition. The authors concluded that stereotype threat is ignited in African Americans by the anticipation of taking a test where ability will be tested, and would therefore not want to report their race for various reasons. Test 4 was designed to test if stereotype threat would arise and cause performance difficulties even when participants were not being explicitly tested for ability. Twenty-two Black (6 male) and 22 White (11 male) participants were tested on a verbal intelligence test after either being asked to report their race, or not. Black participants who first reported their race did statistically worse on the test then all other groups (though not significantly less then Whites who did not report race). The conclusion for this test and the final conclusion was that the performance of African Americans would be negatively affected in a situation where stereotype threat arises.

This study is a strong one for a number of reasons. To begin with, whenever a study serves to explore stereotypes and their affect on populations, studying a truly relevant topic, then those researchers must be applauded. Furthermore, the design of the study, using separate studies to build their conclusions, as well as the measures the authors chose to utilize are very innovative. Finally, this study created a strong background of previous research to support their efforts, and well discussed limitations of those works.

While this study is quite well prepared, there are some limitations to it. Primarily, we must look at the original theory that the authors propose. They claim that stereotype threat exists to undermine performance when it arises. However, we must consider the possibility that not all people of a race will react the same way to a perception of being judged by their race, or by essentially being challenged to represent their race. After all, is not that the idea we fight against, that stereotypes are merely descriptions of what people perceive about a race, but that do not actually describe groups of individuals in that race? We can suppose that stereotype threat can be compared to being challenged, and previous research has shown that while some people crumble under pressure, others thrive. The demographics of people who succeed in academics verses those who do not, coming from the same socioeconomic and cultural background, attests to that. Furthermore, the authors base their entire study on the assumption that all Blacks will first feel the stereotype threat, based only on the fact that they are Black, and then, that that will affect their performance. We must wonder, if the participants are not informed of the fact that they are being tested against different races, why would they automatically assume that they are being judged based on their race? In this case, perhaps a measure testing if participants feel they are being measured for their ability based on their race would be helpful. As the studies were designed, we could not really conclude that it was stereotype threat that caused the results in Tests 1 and 2. The instructions for the diagnostic and non-diagnostic groups were very subtle, and self-reports in Test 1 showed that the majority of people believed, from all condition groups, that the test given was a measure of ability. Since this variable was meant to prompt stereotype threat, this compromises the conclusions drawn from the results. Test 3, since it did not have a test to measure actual performance, did establish that some stereotype threat arose, but did not really show that this would then affect performance. Test 4, while seemingly the most stable assessment of results, also had a difficulty in basing its activation of stereotype threat on one measure from Test 3 (reporting race), which was not necessarily enough to cause this threat, even if the threat did have the affect on performance that was hypothesized.

This brings us to another important issue in the study. The authors made conclusions on results that did not show statistical significance in several cases. Particularly important, the first test did not show statistical significance until the authors removed one of the controls, and even then, this showed only marginal significance. The authors used Test 2, which consisted of a much smaller sample, and difference condition groups to prove reliability of a result that they did not actually achieve in the first test. Using the conclusions (the performance on verbal intelligence tests is negatively affected by stereotype threat) in Tests 1 and 2, the authors concluded in Test 3 that stereotype threat does arise when ability is tested for Black verses White participants. This conclusion, of course, is based on the assumption that the diagnostic condition was really different than the non-diagnostic condition, which was questioned in test 1, meaning there could be a different reason altogether for the results. Finally, Test 4 was based on all of these previous conclusions, which are tenuous, at best. Furthermore, the measures used to test for stereotype threat, such as reporting of race, could merely be a test of defensiveness to racial discrimination (an aspect of stereotype threat), without the implication that this would cause people to feel judged, compared based on race, required to defend their race, or all the other attributes associated with stereotype threat.

Finally, we have to consider a few demographic differences in the different groups tested. First, we could see that there were consistently more females in all the groups tested. The authors reported that this was not a factor that affected the results, but it would be helpful to see how they came to that conclusion. A possibly more important distinction, however, was that the White groups had consistently higher SAT scores on which performance was based. The authors claimed to adjust for SAT scores when making assessments of performance in each condition group on the verbal intelligence tests, but what type of adjustments they made, we do not know. We also do not know if the fact that the White participants had higher primary scores made them characteristically different from the Black participants in ways that were not considered, such as more achievement motivation qualities, or better test-taking skills, that would account for the results, even with the adjustments made for actual score differences. Also, SAT score level was not shown for each condition group, only for Black verses White participants, and that may have been a factor that would be important to the results, since it was used as a baseline score. Another issue would be that the samples for all the Tests except Test 1 were so small that it is difficult to trust the results their garnered to be applicable to a larger population. On that note, since the population consisted of all very achievement oriented people in a popular college with relatively high scores on the SATs to begin with, we may assume that they do not represent the general population of both Black and White people.

Clearly, this study had many good features to it. The design of the study was complex, using multiple tests and measures to account for their conclusions. However, some of the conclusions drawn were based on results that were not reliable, causing a chain affect throughout the different designs used in the study. However, this is a unique look at the possible causes of the phenomena of different performance levels of people from different races in academics, which is quite a relevant issue in our society.

Andelman, A. (2008). Stereotype Threat(2). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/11/stereotype-threat-classic.html

Using a Joystick to Increase Identification with Math

Article critique of
Kerry Kawakami, Jennifer R. Steele, Claudia Cifa, Curtis E. Phills, and John F. Dovidio (2007). Approaching math increases Math=me and Math= pleasant. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 818-825
by Alla Andelman

This study, done in two parts, tested women’s identification with math based on approach behavior training, with two other variables in two separate experiments. In the first experiment, women (44 participants total) with a low identification with math were tested against women with a high identification with math to test their implicit identification attitude and implicit positive regard attitude for math (as tested by the identification IAT and attitude IAT) after going through approach behavior training for approach verses avoidance. The results showed that women with a low initial identification had a higher implicit identification and positive regard for math when in the approach verses avoid training group. However, the women with a high initial identification showed almost equally high implicit positive regard from both training groups, and a much higher implicit identification to math for the avoid training group. In the second experiment, 56 women with a low initial identification to math were tested with an approach behavior training verses neutral behavior training, for its affect on implicit identification to math and for behavior during a math test. The results showed that women who had approach training had a higher identification response rate than women who went through neutral training. Also, women who went through approach training had a slightly higher rate of attempting more math questions on a quiz, though not doing better on this quiz. The authors concluded that if women who originally have a low identification with math are given an intervention for approach behavior, they will have an improved identification and regard for math. Also, they will be more likely to attempt to do math, hopefully improving their proficiency in math. They also theorized that women with an already high identification with math would be threatened with stereotype bias, namely that men are more proficient in math, and that will possibly hinder or destroy their identification with math if pushed to approach behavior.

The study has several very positive aspects which we should consider. Firstly, the undertaking of a very relevant social issue in today’s society is very admirable. The authors postulate that the reasons that job positions associated to the fields of math and science are filled with a large majority of men is that social views and stereotypes influence women to avoid or be disinterested in those fields. They further say that this is not due to proficiency in these fields, as has been claimed to be the case. This theory has been circulated for at least a couple of decades now, but the alternative explanation of men’s superiority is sometimes too potent in the minds of society to overcome. To put such a hypothesis to practical application and testing it would go a long way toward shining a light on this controversy. Another advantage to this study is that authors’ innovative idea that women’s identification with a subject or field would allow them to become more willing to try within that field with which they would not traditionally expect themselves to be involved. Furthermore, they claim that this identification with the field could be facilitated by an approach behavior intervention. Another particularly interesting aspect of this study is the way the authors tested identification and regard for math among women. They used an identification IAT and attitude IAT that tests the implicit attitudes that women have for math, rather than a subjective self-report of the same using reaction time to positive verses negative stimuli when paired with math.

While this is an interesting study, there are some inherent problems with it. These can be considered in two parts, one affecting the next. The first is in the authors’ initial assumptions about women and their attitudes toward math that shaped the study, and the conclusions which they draw based on these assumptions. The other is in the physical set up of the study and the question of construct validity. The initial questionable assumption that the authors discuss is that women who have a high identification with math also have a high vigilance for the stereotypes associated with the field as relating to men verses women. This is saying that women who are invested in math, and identify it as something they are a part of are very aware and wary of the stereotypes of others on their proficiency in math. This is also implying that women who do not associate math as something that is a part of themselves are not as aware of this stereotype, or are not alert to the stereotype when it presents itself. There is no proof to this assumption, nor even any theoretical backing for it in the article, and is a big assumption on which to base conclusions. This theory is used to explain the fact that women with an initially high identification with math are not improved by approach training, but sometimes even hindered by it. The explanation is that women who are pressured by stereotype threat, when pushed to identify with a field that is not stereotypically one they belong in, women de-identify with it as a result. This is quite a leap in logic, and further is not well enough explained to give a well understood and studied reason for this step to de-identify when such pressure exist. The question that many people would have is why would these women, who are wary of stereotype, and so have been familiar with the opinions of their abilities for a long time feel as though they do not belong to this field now, when given approach training? Why would they still show signs are positive regard for it, as that was unchanged, but no longer have an implicit identification to math? Why now, after having gone, presumably, a long time liking and being good at math to suddenly not identify with it because they are pushed to approach something they have already been approaching in their lives? Feeling pressure to perform in a stereotyped field where your gender is not expected to excel can hinder someone who is not already proficient in that field; that makes sense. There is research in sports showing that people who are good at a sport excel under pressure, while those who are bad at it get worse with pressure. This can be applied here. However, this assumption that the authors postulate either is not well fleshed out or is not well explained.

Now, considering the fact that initial identification with math is such an important variable in this study, it seems ill advised how casually this assessment was garnered. Initial identification in the first test is assessed based on each participant merely stating on a seven point scale if they liked math and how good they were at math. If they reported a score of 4 or higher on both measures, they were labeled as highly identified with math. Assuming that these two variables accurately measure identification with math, this is acceptable. However, if the participant reported a score of less than 4 on either measure, they were labeled as not identifying with math. Someone who is good at math, though doesn’t like do it, or doesn’t like school in general, or doesn’t like that math requires homework, whatever the reason, is very different from someone who doesn’t like it because it is hard for them. In the same vein, someone who likes math, but finds it very difficult, and they know it is not something they are inherently good at is also very different from the previous two types. Just not liking it or not being good at it alone does not mean the person is not identified with math. Someone who considers themselves having a logical mind may identify themselves with math without liking algebra or without being good at trigonometry. In the same way, the authors test initial low identification to math based on how much the participant liked five different math related activities. In the first experiment, they made note to differentiate between identification with math and regard for math, having gotten a different pattern of results. In the second experiment, they use a test of regard for identification, contradicting themselves. Clearly this main variable used in the study is not well measured enough to warrant the kinds of conclusions that the authors are claiming. Furthermore, no baseline was measured for the participants in their level of identification for math, regard for math, or test taking habits. Therefore, we can not say that low identification participants improved their identification, but that they merely had a higher identification rate than the alternate group. Since true initial identification rate has not been established, the results are questionable in content validity. Can we say that both low identification groups are the same, or that low verses high identification groups are truly different?

Another issue exists within construct validity. The moderator of ability in math is essentially overlooked in the experiment, even while discussed in the introduction and conclusion sections. Perceived ability is vaguely used as a measure of initial identification rate in experiment one, but is overlooked in whether it affects any of the results afterward. Isn’t actual ability a reasonable variable to consider when testing for identification with a field, regard for the field, and test taking behavior? The results of test taking behavior show that ability was about the same between groups given the approach treatment verses a neutral treatment, but that those who received the approach treatment attempted more questions. If we look at the numbers, they attempted about one more question than the other group, where only 12 questions existed. Furthermore, since only the average of correct answers were used as well as the average number of attempts, we must wonder whether the results would naturally be about the same, since ability is never considered, and we can naturally assume that some participants in each group was reasonable good at math on a “difficult quiz”, though difficult for whom, we do not know.

Lastly, we may consider what this approach behavior treatment technique really entails. This asks participants to move a joystick toward themselves when math symbols or words come up, verses art symbols and words, for which they move the joystick away. This is a technique the authors report has been used for a study of attitudes of prejudice towards people. This author is skeptical to accept the concept that moving a joystick towards oneself is equivalent to approaching a topic we normally do not associate with and making it part of ourselves. Perhaps there is a great deal of research proving this, but the authors of the article did not see fit to share the type of information with us. They certainly did not explain their rational for using it, besides to say it is a similar concept to the study already mentioned.

In conclusion, this study was an ambitious one. The truths we are taught to assume about ourselves based on social norms is an interesting topic. It is also quite relevant in our current environment. However, we must view the results that Kawakami et al. make, and the conclusions they draw with a grain of salt. Hopefully, more studies will follow this one, having altered some of methods of this study to eliminate some of its drawback, and therefore strengthen the conclusions that these authors propose.

Andelman, A. (2008). Using a Joystick to Increase Identification with Math (2). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/11/using-joystick-to-increase.html

False Memories and Behavior

A review of:

Geraerts, E., Bernstein, D.M., Merckelbach, H., Linders, C., Raymaekers, L., & Loftus, E.F. (2008). Lasting false beliefs and their behavioral consequences. Psychological Science, 19, 749-753.

by Micol Levi-Minzi

In this article Geraerts, et al. (2008) sought to examine the relationship between false memories and long-lasting changes in behavior. The authors cite examples of false memories such as satanic ritual abuse, previous lives and space alien abduction all of which can greatly impact an individual’s behaviors. Geraerts et al. (2008) suggest that misleading information or even suggestive techniques used in therapy may be the source of these false beliefs. While some research shows that false memories may impact attitudes and beliefs, no research has been conducted on the influence of false beliefs on long-lasting behavioral changes. In this study, the authors question if this link exists. More specifically, Geraerts et al. (2008) hypothesize that by falsely suggesting to participants that they had experienced a negative event specific to a particular food item in their past, long term changes would occur in how participants behaved in regard to that food item. The independent variable in this investigation was the false belief that the researchers suggested to the participants. Consequently, the dependent variable was the level of change in behavior in response to the false belief. The study utilized 180 participants who were screened so as to exclude those with eating disorders. The participants were first-year undergraduate students from a university who were then randomly assigned to either a control group or a false belief group.

The study spanned three different sessions with each participant. In the first sessions participants were asked to complete a food history inventory that asked whether or not specific events had occurred to them. Also administered was a food preference questionnaire and a questionnaire that asked subjects to rank their likelihood of consuming specific foods if they were at a party. During the second meeting participants were given false information. The false information was given under the guise that their previously filled-out questionnaires had been entered into a computer and the computer had generated a profile for them. The participants were told that they had become ill when they had consumed egg salad during childhood. Subsequently, participants were asked to fill out the same three questionnaires from the first session as well as a memory-belief questionnaire containing three items from the food history inventory, one of which was egg salad. The second session ended with a debriefing conducted by a researcher, who did not know anything about the groups. The participants were thanked for being in the study by being offered three different types of sandwiches, one of which was egg-salad. The researcher recorded the types of sandwiches consumed.

The final session was held four months later under the semblance of a completely unrelated research study. Of the 180 original participants, 153 participated in session three. Participants were told to taste test of a variety of foods and liquids, one of which was egg salad. They were asked to complete filler questionnaires as well as the three original questionnaires that had been modified so as to not remind the participants of the previously completed questionnaires. At the end of the experiment researchers revealed the true purpose of the sessions. Also, participants were asked to check with their parents as to whether or not they did in fact have a negative egg-salad event during childhood.

Results from the study indicate that false memories can indeed induce both immediate and long-lasting behavior changes. Geraerts et al. (2008) found that a small percentage of the participants in this study changed their eating behavior in regard to egg salad both immediately and four months later. The link may have resounding effects in the legal world given that false memories have recently become a critical issue in many cases, specifically those involving child abuse. This new found link between false memories and behavior changes must be explored further with more research because of its potential impacts in both the world of psychology and law.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Levi-Minzi, M. (2008). False Memories and Behavior. Psychology Alert (2). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/11/false-memories-and-behavior.html

More than just violent television programs

More than just violent television programs
by Rice, J. M.

A review of:
Feshbach, Seymour, & Tangney, June. (2008). Television viewing and aggression: Some alternative perspectives. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(5), 387-389.

Despite the extensive amount of research devoted to the effects of exposure to violence on television, studies examining additional significant variables have been minimal. Social policy makers are concerned with television that is obviously aggressive, but as Feshbach & Tangney note, it is also important to also include any additional parameters that might contribute to television violence. Feshbach & Tangney identified influential factors as being the kind of violence that is portrayed, its dramatic context, its outcome, or attributes of the central character, and observer variables such as affective state, personality, and social class. Additional factors include the social and historical context in which the program is being viewed.

Feshbach & Tangney pinpoint program context, and state that TV programs have different levels of violence, and their portrayal will determine the program’s likelihood of cultivating aggression. They state the difference is that programs containing internal conflict and concern, where violence is secondary, may actually be cathartic and reduce aggression. They pose that the viewing of these programs may serve as a way of eradicating emotions.

In the current study it is hypothesized that the more a dramatic presentation portraying violence focuses on internal conflict and feelings of the central character, the less likely it will augment aggression. In addition, the more a program focuses on aggressive and violent behaviors, the more likely it is to increase aggression. It is noted that their hypothesis is not to defy current research, but to illustrate that research on the effects of viewing dramatic presentations including violence, and the parameters influencing these effects, is limited.

The current study suggests cultural factors associated with race or ethnicity may also influence the effects of TV programs on viewers. Past research has been limited to television viewing behavior, and has not included any correlation between television viewing and aggressive behavior with race and ethnicity being a moderating factor.

The findings of this study indicate the importance of distinguishing between racial groups when establishing the relationship between TV viewing behavior and aggression. The study assessed TV viewing, intelligence and adjustment to 4th, 5th and 6th grade of children, using a combined cross sectional, longitudinal study. Additionally, measures of the child’s adjustment were completed by teachers and mothers. IQ was assessed using the Otis-Scoring Mental Ability Test (Otis, 1965), and children’s self concept with Piers-Harris scale (Piers & Harris, 1969). A global rating by teachers was used to determine academic performance, a modified School Behavior Checklist, Form A2 (Miller, 1977) was used to measure aggression, and parent report measures from subscales of the Achenbach Behavior Checklist (Achenbach, 1978; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1979) were used to identify delinquency and cruelty.

Television viewing behavior was assessed by providing children with a TV Guide including a list of all television programs of the areas eight major commercial and two cable stations from the last seven days, and asking them to check which programs they actually watched for each half hour interval. Frequency was recorded for each hour of TV watched within the previous week.

The study defined a violent program as one in which violence was the central theme, or demonstrated more violence than one would normally encounter in daily life. Inter-rater reliability was over 90%. Violent TV score was obtained through the sum of violent TV program hours watched during the week.

It was found that, overall the amount of violent programs viewed was linked to negative personality traits for White males, and both White and African American females. Results indicated a negative correlation between violent TV viewing and academic performance. They concluded that African-American males view more violent programs, and have lower academic performance ratings than White males. It is suggested that television viewing may serve a different function for each racial and gender group.

The findings were not anticipated and further replication and interpretation of data is necessary. Feshbach & Tangney pose that factors overriding the aggression effects of violent television programs may be more prominent for African American males. Possible factors may be TV drama causing positive feelings, inhibition of aggressive behavior by viewing aggressive behaviors that lead to punishment, and the idea that the more time spend watching violent television the less time spent on the streets.

With the conclusion of this study comes the need for a more general conceptualization of the effects of television violence, including the influence of personality, ethnicity, social context, dramatic context, and other significant factors.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Rice, J. M. (2008). More than just violent television programs. Psychology Alert (1). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/10/more-than-just-violent-television.html

Ritualizing As a Coping Strategy

Ritualizing As a Coping Strategy

by Gelman, I.

A review of:

Boyer, P. & Lienard, P. (2008). Ritual Behavior in Obsessive and Normal Individuals. Moderating Anxiety and Reorganizing the Flow of Action. Psychological Science, (17) 4, 291-294.

Checking the door 200 times before bed, cleaning a table in counterclockwise circles, plugging and unplugging the toaster 24 times before leaving the house – these are all behaviors of obsessive-compulsive disorder. These various ritualized behaviors are characterized by compulsions (the person feels they must perform these actions), goal-demotion (no connection between goal and action), redundancy (actions repeated a certain number of times), and rigidity (actions must be accomplished in a certain sequence). In their article, Pascal Boyer and Pierre Lienard, from University of Washington in St. Louis, write that OCD behaviors can be observed in nonclinical populations, especially children and cultural ceremonies. They go on to explain that the behaviors are probably linked to our inherent precaution system, which is necessary to detect potential danger and protect ourselves. In their article, Ritual Behavior in Obsessive and Normal Individuals. Moderating Anxiety and Reorganizing the Flow of Action, published in 2008, Boyer and Lienard explain their theory. They state that intrusive thoughts (and their responses) are not exclusive to OCD. Previous studies show that the pathological aspect of OCD behaviors stems from wrongly appraising threats in the environment and how much control one has over it. If one perceives himself to have little control, he is more likely to ritualize pathologically. Children engage in ritualized behaviors, with their rituals specifically linked to anxiety states, such as fear of strangers and risk of inflicting harm to self or someone else. On the other hand, cultural rituals are centered on collective ritualized behaviors that work because people believe in them, and people believe in them precisely because they are ritualized. Authors site several studies describing the fact that, from an evolutionary perspective, human beings need to be vigilant to ensure their survival. For example, higher attentional load of parents’ preoccupation about harm to the infant seems highly adaptive. However, it seems that OCD is a pathological exaggeration of normal functioning. Authors describe the difference between a nonclinical person performing an action and an OCD patient is that in the OCD individual, the action seems to be disconnected from the goal and focus shifts to the gestures. Boyer and Lienard contend that because ritualized behavior overloads working memory, it aides in thought-suppression. Theoretically, this could mean that people with OCD need to suppress, and the rituals serve as a tool to do so. The questions still remains, why does ritualized behavior result in thought suppression? Boyer and Lienard explain that further studies are needed to answer this question.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Gelman, I. (2008). Ritualizing As a Coping Strategy, Psychology Alert (1). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/10/ritualizing-as-coping-strategy.html

Understanding Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Understanding Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
by Cohen, G. E.

A review of:

Abramowitz, J.S., Lackey, G. R., & Wheaton, M. G. (In-press). Obsessive-compulsive symptoms: The contribution of obsessional beliefs and experiential avoidance. Journal of Anxiety Disorders.

In their current study, Abramowitz, Lackey and Wheaton seek to compare a new theory for the primary mechanism underlying the symptoms of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) with the currently prevailing model. OCD includes symptoms of unwanted anxiety-evoking thoughts, images, and impulses (obsessions), and urges to perform behavioral or mental acts in an effort to reduce the anxiety felt (compulsions). Prevailing models of OCD state that obsessions result from maladaptive, negative interpretations of normal intrusive thoughts. 90% of the population experience some form of unwanted thought (Rachman & deSilva, 1978) but people with OCD treat these unwanted thoughts as highly significant and threatening, and so they feel these thoughts must be highly controlled. The misinterpretation of these thoughts leads to obsessional anxiety and rituals designed to control or minimize that anxiety.

Abramowitz, Lackey and Wheaton sought to determine if another mechanism, known as experiential avoidance (EA) better explain the symptoms and underlying beliefs associated with OCD. EA is characterized by an “unwillingness to endure upsetting emotions, thoughts, memories and other private experiences.” This unwillingness then leads to significant efforts to avoid or escape these experiences, resulting in compulsions (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Stroahl, 1996).

In order to explore the relationship between EA and OCD, Abramowitz, et al. recruited a sample of 353 undergraduate students who scored high on a self-report measure of obsessive compulsive symptoms. These undergraduate students then took 4 different self-report measures through an online system and these measures were analyzed to determine the extent to which they evidenced experiential avoidance versus maladaptive cognitions. It was found that participants that scored higher on symptoms of OCD also scored higher on measures of EA. However, it was unable to be determined if EA was specific to obsessive compulsive symptoms or if it is a characteristic of anxiety symptoms in general. Additionally, it was found that the maladaptive thought hypothesis better explained their results than did the experiential avoidance hypothesis. Indeed, dysfunctional beliefs regarding normal thoughts, and not the unwillingness to endure negative internal experiences, best explained many of the symptoms associated with OCD. These findings have important implications for the treatment of OCD and suggest that OCD may be best treated by helping an individual to change their pathological beliefs rather than learning to accept and endure the presence of these thoughts.

To cite this review, please use this reference:
Cohen, G., E. (2008). Understanding Obsessive Compulisve Disorder, Psychology Alert (1). http://psychologyalert.com/2008/10/understanding-obsessive-compulsive.html